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In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of Fiscal Federalism. We 
use a non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent model to characterize the optimal intergovernmental 
grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and 
actions of local governments, and under citizen free mobility. We show that local 
governments earn informational rents, and how optimal local taxes, public good production 
levels and land prices are jointly distorted at the second-best optimum, as a consequence of 
free mobility and asymmetric information. The effect of informational asymmetries is to 
decrease the average production of public goods and to increase the inter-jurisdictional 
variance of taxes and public-good production. 
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Since Tiebout￿ s (1956) seminal work, the extent to which citizens￿free mobility helps mitigat-
ing ine¢ ciencies in the allocation of local public goods has been studied in various contexts1.
In the present article, Tiebout meets La⁄ont and Tirole2 in the land of Fiscal Federalism3.
We study a non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent problem in which the Principal is a central gov-
ernment, the Agents are local governments, and in which citizens are free to move from one
jurisdiction to the other. In each jurisdiction, there is a land market, the local government
chooses a local tax, and the production level of a local public good. Local governments are
rent and reelection-seeking politicians, with a clear incentive to pump out money from the
central government. Any change in local public policies may trigger population movements,
changing local tax revenues, and therefore local de￿cits. The central government￿ s policy
objective is to minimize the cost of transfers to local governments￿ i.e., the total sum of
grants ￿ plus any ￿nancial costs or interest charges associated with public de￿cits, subject
to the local governments￿individual rationality constraints, and subject to the constraints
of a free-mobility equilibrium. This de￿cit minimization problem is shown to be equivalent
to maximization of the sum of local governments￿utilities, and characterizes optimality in
a certain sense. We study this problem under asymmetric information: the center cannot
disentangle the impact of unobserved local conditions and unobservable cost-reduction ef-
forts of the local government on the cost of local public goods. We analyze the second-best
optimal contract, called the "internal stability pact", in this Principal-Multi-Agent setting.
The solution gives an optimal grant function, as well as local production levels and tax rates.
Our approach thus combines elements of Political Economy with optimal regulation
theory. By Political Economy, we mean that the local governments￿objectives do not try to
maximize the citizens￿welfare, but maximize instead a politician￿ s utility function in which
reelection probability and rents enter as arguments. In addition, we study a benchmark
variant of the model in which local governments are benevolent welfare maximizers. Finally,
our central government has no aversion for inequality, and thus no redistribution motive: we
1For a recent survey of the literature on local public goods, see Scotchmer (2001).
2See La⁄ont and Tirole (1986), (1993).
3See the classic contribution, Oates (1972), and for a more recent survey of the ￿eld, see Oates (2004).
2therefore isolate a pure e¢ ciency problem.
Our results can be summarized as follows. In the complete information case, we derive
the optimal grant schedule, in both the "Political Economy" and "Welfare Maximization"
variants of the model. The ￿rst-order conditions for this problem form a complex system of
integral equations, that can be solved analytically in the linear-quadratic case. We discuss
the meaning of these equations and then focus on the linear-quadratic case, in which the
optimal grant can be fully derived. Optimal local public-good productions, taxes, cost-
reduction e⁄orts, and land prices are decreasing functions of the jurisdiction￿ s marginal cost
type; the optimal grant schedule is a cost-reimbursement rule that leaves a zero rent to all
local governments. If citizens are made more mobile, the inter-jurisdictional variances of
taxes and public productions do increase. Comparison of the "Political Economy" with the
"Welfare Maximization" solution shows that the two variants are in fact qualitatively very
similar.
Under asymmetric information, the central government can observe local unit costs of
production, but cannot disentangle the contribution of "natural" conditions (i.e., the type),
from the e⁄ect of cost-reduction e⁄orts. A higher type corresponds to a higher marginal cost
of production, ceteris paribus. There is a continuum of possible local conditions, or types,
described by a given probability distribution. Incentive compatibility requires the payment
of an informational rent, which is decreasing with type, to all local governments, except
the least e¢ cient one. All local governments contribute to de￿cit reduction e⁄orts (i.e.,
share "budgetary austerity"), and not only those who run a de￿cit. Second-best optimal
local productions and taxes are decreasing functions of the jurisdiction type (in fact of the
"virtual type"), with joint distortions of taxes and productions. The e⁄ect of informational
asymmetries is to reduce average production, and to increase the variance of both local
productions and taxes. The citizen￿ s average utility is smaller under asymmetric information,
as compared to the complete information benchmark. The results obtained are very di⁄erent
from the case of immobile consumers, in which the model boils down to a standard Principal-
Agent model. In the free-mobility case, there is a distortion "at the top" (i.e., for the most
e¢ cient jurisdiction), and local taxes are distorted too. The interplay of taxes, land prices
and public good productions is more subtle in the case of free mobility.
3Relationship with the literature
In a recent survey of Fiscal Federalism, Oates (2004), describes the evolution of the ￿eld,
since the early classic work, as a progressive synthesis using elements coming from other liter-
atures. The theory had ￿rst to react to its Public-Choice school critics, and had to amend or
remove the government benevolence assumptions used in the classic normative approaches4.
In the past decade, concepts and techniques from information economics, the theory of in-
centives and the theory of the ￿rm, have been imported in the ￿eld. Important recent work
poses the problem of the optimal degree of decentralization; see for instance Gilbert and
Picard (1996), Lockwood (2002), Besley and Coate (2003), La⁄ont and Zantman (2002)5.
The theory of the ￿rm and more particularly, the theory of incomplete contracts, has been
applied to the question of decentralization; see J. Cremer et al. (1996); Seabright (1996).
Finally, Principal-Agent theory has been a source of inspiration for a number of recent papers
devoted to decentralization and ￿scal redistribution in a federation, or a multi-jurisdictional
model; among other contributions, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1996), Cremer, Marchand and
Pestieau (1996), Ra⁄and Wilson (1997), Bucovetsky, Marchand and Pestieau (1998), Lock-
wood (1999), Boadway, Horiba and Jha (1999), Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001),
Cornes and Silva (2002), Besfamille (2002).
Some of these papers deal with the incentives when tasks, such as public works, must
be delegated to local agents (Boadway et al. (1999), Besfamille (2002)). A number of other
contributions have focused on inter-regional redistribution (or insurance) problems. Cremer
et al. (1996) study a federation in which members possess two unobserved characteristics:
income and taste for public goods. They perform an optimal tax analysis of this economy
and show that second-best optimal redistribution is limited by informational problems. Bu-
covetsky et al.(1998) consider again the optimal subsidy problem in a federation in which
members di⁄er by their preferences for public goods, when local governments rely on cap-
ital income taxation. They show that distortions in both the allocation of capital and the
production of public goods are the result of the center￿ s incomplete information.
Ra⁄and Wilson (1997) consider the income redistribution problem between regions in
4For a survey of these approaches, see Inman and Rubinfeld (1997).
5These papers o⁄er various theories of the trade-o⁄ between centralization and decentralization.
4the presence of mobile workers, when the local productivity of work, which is not observed by
the center, depends on some public e⁄ort (costly public inputs) which is also unobservable.
Lockwood (1999) studies an inter-regional optimal insurance problem, in which risk-averse
regions are subject to privately observed random shocks of various types. He studies optimal
grants when there are public-good spillovers between regions, and shows the existence of a
"two-way distortion" of public production, i.e., there can be oversupply as well as under-
supply with respect to the ￿rst-best production rule, depending on the value of the shock.
Cornes and Silva (2002) study the optimal interregional redistribution problem when the cost
of providing local public goods is the di⁄erence between an unknown type and unobserved
local government e⁄ort; they ￿nd analogous results: distortions of both cost-reducing e⁄orts
and local public good production.
As compared to the articles cited above, the present contribution considers the optimal
grant problem in the case of a continuum of unobservable jurisdictions types, combined
with perfectly mobile citizens, local land markets, and ￿scal externalities due to population
migrations. This gives rise to a genuine Principal-Multi-Agent model, and, as far as we
know, this has not been done before. Ra⁄ and Wilson￿ s (1997) pioneering work considers
worker mobility, but only two types of jurisdictions, with no interdependent land or real
estate markets, and no ￿scal externalities. Cornes and Silva (2002) and Lockwood (1999)
have analyzed a Principal-Agent model in the continuum-of-types case, but with immobile
representative consumers. A study of the continuum-of-types model is of course useful, to the
extent that it allows a better understanding of the optimal grant function￿ s properties, with
a realism that the illustrative two-types case doesn￿ t possess. In addition, our (relatively)
simple model has a normative, (i.e, welfare maximization) and a "positive" (i.e; "Political
Economy") variant, that can easily be compared.
We think that La⁄ont and Tirole￿ s (1986) model is well-adapted to study the problem
delineated above. Budgetary e⁄orts, whether they take the form of (local) tax increases or
of reductions in local public good production, are unpopular. The vote maximizing behavior
of local politicians will lead them to exert a sub-optimal level of de￿cit-reduction e⁄ort, from
the central government￿ s point of view. The central government￿ s ability to provide correct
incentives to local governments essentially depends on the information it possesses, and this
5can vary form one country to the other. In many countries, the central government levies local
taxes on behalf of local authorities, who vote on local tax rates. Due to this particular form
of organization (tax collection monopoly of the center), the central government is necessarily
endowed with many pieces of information (on local tax rates, tax bases, and budgets) and
can try to curb local public expenditure via its grants to local public authorities. Due to
the fact that local budgets are public information, the center observes total cost, as well as
the quantity of public goods produced locally, but cannot distinguish which part of the cost
can be attributed to e⁄ort and which part depends on hidden local conditions: this precisely
corresponds to La⁄ont and Tirole￿ s (1986) model of optimal regulation under asymmetric
information, that we adapted to our setting.
Our analysis has been motivated by the desire to study the internal consequences of
EU agreements for euro-zone states, which is one among several other possible applications.
The new budgetary rules established by the Maastricht Treaty, strengthened by the "Growth
and Stability Pact", compel each euro-zone member state to a national de￿cit-reduction
policy6 To enforce budgetary discipline, the Treaty of Amsterdam speci￿es a number of
mechanisms, both preventive and repressive, leading to ￿nancial penalties imposed on the
faulty member state￿ s central government.
An internal incentives problem stems from the fact that de￿cit and debt ratios apply
to the consolidated budget of all public administration bodies, including central and local
governments, whereas central authorities only are held responsible for violations. Without
a mechanism for explicitly sharing the e⁄orts made to curb de￿cits, local public administra-
tions would conduct tax and budget policies without taking their impact on global de￿cits
into account. To abide by the terms of European commitments, central governments should
then design and implement coordination mechanisms, with the power to internalize bud-
get externalities, and to ensure local budget policies￿overall compatibility with national
objectives.
In the following, Section 2 describes the model, the agents￿utility functions and
the land markets. Section 3 analyzes the central government￿ s optimization problem under
6Compliance with budgetary rules can be assessed by comparing consolidated public de￿cits with reference
ratios: public de￿cits must remain below 3 % of GNP and public debt must not exceed 60 % of GNP.
6conditions of complete (and symmetric) information; a Political-Economy version and a
Welfare-Maximization version of the model are compared. Section 4 derives the optimal
grant function, local taxes, and local public good productions in the asymmetric information
case. Concluding remarks are gathered in Section 5.
2 The model
The economy consists of a State, run by a central government (also called the "center"), and a
large number of local jurisdictions, with the same level in the hierarchy of public authorities,
and administered by local governments (also called the Agents). Local governments represent
citizen￿ s preferences in a certain sense, to be made precise below. A local public good,
￿nanced through local taxes and grants from the center, is produced in each jurisdiction.
Local public goods do not generate inter-jurisdictional spillovers. In each local jurisdiction,
there is a land (or real estate) market. Citizens "vote with their feet", and select the
jurisdiction with the best bundle of local public goods, taxes and land prices. Any citizen
moving in a given jurisdiction must buy (or rent) a piece of land (or a house) of nonzero size.
2.1 The local governments￿types
Local jurisdictions di⁄er only in a cost parameter ￿, hereafter called the local "type". The
population of jurisdictions is described by a probability distribution of type ￿, the density




. Parameter ￿ captures vari-
ous local characteristics which remain imperfectly observed by the central government, like
geographical relief, geological aspects, local market conditions for production inputs, etc.
Let q denote the quantity of a public good produced locally; its total production cost
is de￿ned as C = c(￿)q + k(q) ￿ (￿ ￿ a)q + k(q), where a denotes the local government￿ s
cost-reducing e⁄ort, and k is an increasing, di⁄erentiably convex function of q that doesn￿ t
depend on ￿. This cost of production doesn￿ t depend on the number of consumers. In
many countries, the central government has many pieces of information relative to local
authorities￿accounts, insofar as local budgetary documents are transmitted to the central
7administrative services, or publicly disclosed, and because the (central) Public Treasury acts
as a tax collector, on behalf of the local governments. We then assume that the central
government knows k and always observes C and q ex post. It follows from this assumption
that the unit cost c(￿) = C=q ￿ k(q)=q = ￿ ￿ a is observable. It also follows that e⁄orts
would be observable, if types were observable, for then a = ￿ ￿ c(￿). We also suppose that
the center knows the local tax revenues.
Under asymmetric information, the center cannot decompose the local marginal cost
into its type and e⁄ort components. An e¢ cient local jurisdiction can pose as an ine¢ cient
one by exerting low e⁄ort. We assume that e⁄ort is costly for local governments. Denote
￿(a) the e⁄ort cost function; we assume that this function is continuously di⁄erentiable with
￿0 > 0, ￿00 > 0, ￿(0) = 0.
2.2 The citizens￿utility function and free mobility equilibrium
Let N(￿) denote the number of inhabitants in a jurisdiction of type ￿. There is a continuum
of citizens. The total mass of citizens in the country is assumed ￿xed and normalized to one
(without loss of generality). The following constraint thus holds:
Z ￿
￿
N(￿)f(￿)d￿ = 1; (1)
(provided that N is integrable, of course). From the point of view of citizens, jurisdiction
￿ is characterized by a land price p(￿), a level of local public good production q(￿) and a
local tax t(￿). All citizens are assumed identical for simplicity. If a citizen chooses to settle
in jurisdiction ￿, he or she chooses a quantity of land x, so as to maximize the quasi-linear
utility function,
U = u(q(￿)) ￿ t(￿) + v(x) ￿ p(￿)x; (2)
where u and v are continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing and concave functions. Due
to the additive structure of utility, the demand for land is characterized by the ￿rst-order
necessary (and su¢ cient) condition v0(x) = p. We assume that there is one unit of land in









The indirect utility of a citizen, located in a type ￿ jurisdiction, can therefore be rewritten,
















It is easy to check that Z is decreasing (and invertible). Citizens being assumed identical
and free to move from one jurisdiction to the other, there is a utility value u, such that in
free mobility equilibrium, for all ￿,
u(q(￿)) ￿ t(￿) + Z[N(￿)] = u: (6)
2.3 The local governments￿objective function
The central government pays a grant T (￿) to each local jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction ￿
chooses a local (per capita) tax t(￿). Then, the number of inhabitants N (￿) is the local tax
base, and t(￿)N (￿) is the local tax revenue. From the point of view of the local government,
local public good production has utility S(q) and the local tax has an additively separable
disutility ￿(t), where S and ￿ are di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing functions, with S00 < 0
and ￿00 > 0.
The local government￿ s utility is ￿nally de￿ned as follows:
V = S (q) ￿ ￿(t) ￿ ￿(a) + T + tN ￿ (￿ ￿ a)q ￿ k(q): (7)
There are two possible interpretations of this utility. If it is viewed as the local
politician￿ s objective, we get a model with a Political Economy ￿ avor: ￿(t) is then the
disutility of taxation for the politician, who fears that increasing local taxes might decrease
his (her) reelection probability, and by the same token, he or she values local public goods,
insofar as they increase his (her) electoral support. The rest of the expression is a rent, that is,
the di⁄erence between total ￿nancial resources T +tN, and total costs (￿￿a)q+k(q)+￿(a),
9expressed in money units, that the local politicians can use in various ways for campaigning,
to curry favour with some groups of citizens, ￿nance extravagant expenditures, etc.
If S(q) is interpreted as social utility for the public good, and ￿(t) represents the
social costs of local taxation, the same utility can be interpreted as a normative, Utilitarian
objective, aggregating the local citizens￿preferences over local public goods. Under this
second, normative interpretation, the budget surplus T + tN ￿ (￿ ￿ a)q ￿ k is viewed as
redistributed to citizens in one way or another, and ￿ can be simply rede￿ned as ￿(t;N) =
tN + ’(t). We can also set S = Nu(q) + NZ(N) to connect local government surplus and
the citizens￿real total surplus. A mix of the two interpretations is also legitimate, given that
the scale of S, ￿ and ￿ can be adjusted to represent various weightings of money rents and
the utility of local public policy (q;t;a).
The e⁄ort cost ￿ also supports several interpretations; it can represent the real cost
of resources involved in improving e¢ ciency, including the wages and bonuses paid to those
who exert e⁄ort, and (or) it can be viewed as the aggregate private disutility of local civil
servants, politicians, and possibly other citizens involved. We assume here that ￿ does not
appear as a cost in the public budget, which points to an interpretation in terms of private
costs of cost-reduction e⁄orts.
Local jurisdictions have a clear incentive to pump out money from the central gov-
ernment. The presence of S (q) and ￿(t) can lead local powers to run a de￿cit as part of an
optimal policy. There is no explicit budget constraint at the local level: local governments
can freely run de￿cits. These de￿cits are ￿nanced by local public debt, reimbursed by fu-
ture generations of local taxpayers. The local taste for rent will however limit the extent of
de￿cits.
We ￿nally assume that local jurisdictions cannot be forced to sustain arbitrarily large
penalties, in the particular sense that utility V cannot fall below a "reservation" level V ,
for all type ￿. Let IR(￿) denote this participation, or individual rationality constraint, i.e.
V ￿ V . This can again be interpreted in various ways. It can represent the politicians
reservation utility, under which politicians prefer to resign and surrender the local rights of
control to the central government. In some countries, bankrupt towns fall under the direct
supervision of central government prefects, and therefore cease to exist as independent local
10authorities. Another interpretation is that constitutional rights forbid the central government
to exploit local communities or districts arbitrarily.
2.4 The central government￿ s objective function and de￿cits
To simplify notation, we will use the expectation operator E each time there is an integral






We assume for simplicity that the central government￿ s expenditure is limited to the total
sum of grants to local governments (introducing national taxes and national public goods
in the model would not add anything essential). The central government￿ s budget de￿cit
can thus be expressed as E(T), where the expectation represents the total sum of transfers
to local governments. Given the terms of an international treaty, the central government is
committed to keep consolidated public de￿cits, denoted D, below a given amount D. The
consolidated de￿cit of central and local governments can thus be computed as follows,
D = E(T) + E [cq + k ￿ tN ￿ T] = E [cq + k ￿ tN] (9)
If D > D, in other words, if the consolidated de￿cit is above the limit, we assume that
the central government pays an ￿nancial charge r per unit of excess de￿cit. A possible
interpretation is that the central government is ￿ned by a supra-national authority. The
amount of penalties is de￿ned as
P(D) = rmax(D ￿ D;0); (10)
where r ￿ 0. Local governments running a de￿cit exert a negative externality on the central
government, whereas those who maintain a surplus exert a positive externality. We will focus
on the interesting case in which D > D, or P(D) > 0. Remark that P(D) may represent
the ￿nancial and social costs and (or) the crowding-out e⁄ects of public debt. Parameter r
11can also be interpreted as the interest on public debt, or as the Lagrange multiplier of the
Public authorities￿intertemporal budget constraint.
The central government￿ s utility, denoted W, is de￿ned as follows:
W = ￿E(T) ￿ P (D): (11)
This is tantamount to assuming that the center minimizes the total sum of grants and
￿nancial costs on de￿cits.7
3 Internal Stability Pact under Complete Information
Assume for a moment that the central government perfectly and costlessly observes the type
￿, and the marginal cost c of each local government. This is tantamount to assuming that
the center also infers the e⁄orts, since c = ￿ ￿a. The central government would then choose
q(￿), a(￿), t(￿), and T(￿), so as to maximise utility W, subject to the constraint that




￿ E(T) ￿ r(D ￿ D)
subject to, for all type ￿,
7Note that the central government maximize their own utility, not the sum of the local constituencies￿
utilities. A typical strategy of the central government is to transfer attributions to local governments with-
out transferring their full counterpart in terms of resources, thus freeing resources at the center that can be
invested in the central politicians￿reelection. The center￿ s objective can thus also be interpreted as max-
imization of reelection probability, insofar as this probability is increasing with respect to central budget
"surplus" (i.e., money that can be used in a discretionary way by the center). A limit of this simple model
is of course that votes in favor of the central politicians can depend on the citizens￿utility for local public
goods, and on the amount of local taxes: voters can hold central politicians responsible for forcing local
politicians to cut spending or raise local taxes. Our model could easily be extended to account for these
e⁄ects by adding terms to W. A variant could for instance add a term of the form, ￿E(V );where ￿ represents
the weight of the local politicians￿utilities in the central politician￿ s objective function.
12V = S (q) ￿ ￿(t) ￿ ￿(a) + T + tN ￿ cq ￿ k(q) ￿ V ; (IR(￿))
where to simplify notation, q = q(￿), a = a(￿), c = c(￿) = ￿ ￿ a(￿), t = t(￿), N = N(￿),
and T = T(￿). It is not di¢ cult to check that the constraints IR(￿) will hold as equalities
at the optimum. If the constraint was slack for some non-negligible subset of types, then the
center could reduce transfers on a non-negligible set of types, and spare money. The center
leaves no rents to local governments. We therefore get,
T = ￿S (q) + ￿(t) ￿ tN + cq + k(q) + ￿(a) + V : (12)
We then substitute this expression in the central government￿ s objective function. After
some easy algebra, the center￿ s utility boils down to:
W = E [S (q) ￿ ￿(t) ￿ (1 + r)(cq + k(q) ￿ tN) ￿ ￿(a)] ￿ V + rD (13)
which is equivalent to maximizing the sum of the local governments￿utilities, once ￿nancial
costs (or de￿cit penalties) are shared proportionally. This maximization problem is equiva-
lent to that of a perfectly informed, central politician who adds all local interests together
with an equal weight. In addition, all local governments will share the de￿cit penalties on
an equal footing8. Remark that r can be interpreted as the cost of public debt (if D = 0).
This central government￿ s objective should be maximized, subject to the constraint that the
country is in free-mobility equilibrium.
3.1 Necessary conditions for optimality under free mobility
To solve this problem, remark that, Z being a decreasing, di⁄erentiable function, it can be
inverted, and given that in free-mobility equilibrium, Z[N(￿)] = u￿ u(q(￿)) + t(￿) for all
￿, we get,
N(￿) = Z
￿1[u ￿ u(q(￿)) + t(￿)]; (14)
8The maximization of W is also a way of characterizing a Pareto optimum in an economy in which eco-
nomic agents are the local governments, plus the central government. If we have the normative interpretation
of utilities in mind, maximizing W is equivalent to maximizing the total sum of the citizens￿utilities.
13for all ￿, where it is implicitly understood that N is a function of parameter u, to be
determined in equilibrium. To simplify notation, denote
n = Z
￿1: (15)
The equilibrium value of u is determined by the constraint,
Efn[u ￿ u(q) + t]g = 1: (16)
For given functions q(￿); t(￿), there is a unique value of u that solves the above equation,
because n is monotonic.
The central government￿ s optimum problem is thus to maximize,
E [S (q) ￿ ￿(t) ￿ ￿(a) ￿ (1 + r)(cq + k(q) ￿ tn)] (17)
with respect to q(:); a(:); t(:); and u, subject to (16). Introducing a constant Lagrange
multiplier ￿ for the population constraint, a standard method yields the ￿rst-order necessary
conditions for an optimal contract (i.e., the "internal stability pact") between the central
government and the local governments. Taking derivatives under the expectation operator
with respect to q;t;a for each ￿, and with respect to u, and rearranging terms, yields the
following four conditions,
￿
0(a) = (1 + r)q; (18)
S
0(q) = (1 + r)(c + k




0(t) ￿ [(1 + r)t ￿ ￿]n





where of course n and n0 are functions of the argument z = u ￿ u(q) + t. Solving the ￿rst
equation (i.e., (18)) gives e⁄ort a￿ as a function of q￿ for each type. The second and third
conditions (i.e., (19) and (20)) then jointly determine t￿ and q￿ as a function of ￿ and u.
The value of ￿ is given by (21), and the value of u is ￿nally pinned down by the population
constraint (16).
The interpretation of these optimality conditions is relatively easy. Equation (18) says
that the optimal value of e⁄ort equates the marginal local disutility of e⁄ort with its marginal,
14cost-reduction value (1 + r)q in each jurisdiction. This cost-reduction value naturally takes
the marginal cost of excess de￿cits into account (i.e., it depends on r). Multiplier ￿ is the
marginal value to the central government of one additional citizen in the country. Equation
(21) says that ￿ must also be equal to the average of local tax revenue losses due to mobility-
induced ￿scal-base changes n0, following a unit raise of u (i.e., E(tn0)=E(n0) > 0). This term
is multiplied by (1 + r), to take ￿nancial costs into account. Expression (19) says that at
the optimum, the value to local government ￿ of increasing local public good production
by one unit must be equal to marginal cost (1 + r)(c + k0), minus the tax base gains due
to immigration in local jurisdiction ￿, i.e., (1 + r)tn0u0 < 0, plus the social cost ￿￿n0u0
in￿ icted to all other jurisdictions by the fact that dN = ￿n0u0 > 0 citizens would leave their
jurisdiction to come to ￿. Equation (20) has a parallel interpretation and says that following
a unit increase in local tax dt = 1, the value of local tax revenue gains (1 + r)n must equal
the marginal social cost of local taxation ￿0 plus the net marginal cost of migrations out of
jurisdiction ￿, i.e., ￿[(1+r)t￿￿]n0 > 0. Again, the Lagrange multiplier ￿ appears to re￿ ect
the fact that citizens who leave jurisdiction ￿ will increase the number of taxpayers and tax
revenues in other jurisdictions, which must be taken into account by the central government.
Note ￿nally that (19) and (20) together imply the unusual condition,
S
0(q) ￿ (1 + r)(c + k
0(q)) = u
0(q)[￿
0(t) ￿ (1 + r)n]: (22)
If citizens are immobile, and uniformly distributed among jurisdictions, then n0 = 0
and n = 1 everywhere, so that optimality conditions boil down to ￿0(t) = (1 + r) and
S0(q) = (1 + r)(c + k0(q)): the tax rate and land prices are the same in every location, but,
since c = ￿ ￿ a is not a constant, local production varies from one jurisdiction to the next.
This results in an unequal situation, in which citizens would like to move, if they were able
to.
The system of equations (16), (18)-(21) is very hard to solve, because, due to citizens￿
free mobility, all optimal local policies are interdependent. Given that the expression of ￿
involves the integral of a function of q(￿), and t(￿), we get a system of integral equations,
that cannot be solved with the help of standard algebra and calculus, except in a few special
cases. One such case is when the functions involved are linear-quadratic, so that their ￿rst
15derivatives are linear. To get a more complete understanding of the structure of central
optima in our model, we now turn to the analysis of the linear quadratic case.
3.2 The linear-quadratic case










so that ￿nally we get n0 = ￿￿. Assume in addition that S(q) = sq with s > 0 (note that
adding a quadratic term to this speci￿cation would not lead to a really more general setting,
because k will be assumed quadratic). Given that citizens have the same preferences for
public goods, without much loss of generality, we can assume that u is linear, and that q
is expressed in utility units, that is u(q) = q. We ￿nally assume that all cost functions are
quadratic: ￿(t) = (’=2)t2, ￿(a) = ( =2)a2, and k(q) = (c2=2)q2 where ’,  , c2 > 0.
To simplify notation further, denote q = E(q), t = E(t). Then, with this standard
model, it is easy to see that equation (21) yields ￿ = (1 + r)t. Equation (18) yields a(￿) =
(1= )(1 + r)q(￿). Then, the system of two equations (19) and (20) becomes linear, that is,
after some rearrangement and substitution of (18) and (21), we get,
s = (1 + r)[￿ + c2q ￿ (1 + r) 
￿1q] ￿ ￿(1 + r)(t ￿ t); (25)
’t + ￿(1 + r)(t ￿ t) = ￿￿(1 + r)(u ￿ q + t): (26)
The total population constraint (16) can now be rewritten,
￿(q ￿ t ￿ u) = 1: (27)
Taking the expected values of (25) and (26) and solving for the optimal values (q￿;t
￿), we






[s ￿ (1 + r)E(￿)]







It is obvious that q￿ will be positive if at the same time, s is large enough with respect to
the mean value of ￿ (which is a natural condition, for otherwise, the optimal production of
local public goods could be zero, in some jurisdictions at least), ￿ and k is convex enough,
that is, c2  > 1 + r. We then immediately derive the equilibrium value of u from (27) as
follows, u￿ = q￿ ￿1=￿ ￿t
￿. With these results (that we were able to obtain only because the
model is linear-quadratic), we can rewrite (25)-(26) as follows,
[(1 + r) 
￿1 ￿ c2](q ￿ q
￿) + ￿(t ￿ t
￿) = [￿ ￿ E(￿)]; (30)
￿(1 + r)(q ￿ q
￿) ￿ [’ + 2￿(1 + r)](t ￿ t
￿) = 0: (31)
This system has a unique solution, stated as Result 2, below. Straightforward algebra yields:




￿[’ + 2￿(1 + r)]
￿






(￿ ￿ E(￿)); (33)
where
￿ = [c2 ￿ (1 + r) 
￿1][’ + 2￿(1 + r)] ￿ ￿
2(1 + r): (34)











￿(￿) = (1 + r) 
￿1q
￿(￿): (36)
Now, the interpretation of these results depends on the sign of the system determinant ￿.
Result 3. If   and c2 are large enough, then, there exists an r such that if 0 ￿ r < r,
then ￿ > 0, and as a result, more ine¢ cient (i.e. high ￿) jurisdictions produce less, exert










17A consequence of this result is that balanced-budget rules imposed on local govern-
ments are not optimal.
How does the optimal grant look like? It is de￿ned with the help of q￿(￿), t￿(￿), and
expression (12), that is,
T









￿(￿)] + (￿ ￿ a
￿(￿))q
￿(￿): (38)
This optimal grant function leaves no rents to local governments, whichever their type, so
that V ￿ = V for all ￿. This will no longer be the case under asymmetric information. Finally,
the utility of citizens is (by de￿nition of free mobility equilibrium) the same everywhere, i.e.






n[u￿ ￿ u(q￿(￿)) + t￿(￿)]
￿
: (39)














In the linear-quadratic framework, we get a decreasing price function, provided that ￿ > 0,






[’ + ￿(1 + r)] < 0:
As a consequence, the more e¢ cient the jurisdiction, the more densely populated.
We can ￿nally discuss the impact of the degree of citizen mobility. This degree is
parameterized by ￿. When ￿ goes to zero, the price of land becomes extremely sensitive to
migrations, and as a result, citizens become immobile. When ￿ = 0, Result 2 shows that
taxes are the same everywhere. We can also show the following Result, the proof of which
is straightforward.
Result 4. The variances of local public good production and of local taxes are increasing









183.3 Implementation of the optimum under complete information
It is now easy to implement the optimum under conditions of complete information, pro-
vided that the central government has a reliable estimation of ￿. The central government
can subject all local governments to an incentive transfer schedule e T, depending on e⁄ort,
production, local taxation, and population, which should be de￿ned as follows,
e T = ￿r(cq + k ￿ tn) ￿ n￿ + M(￿); (40)
where M(￿) is an appropriate function, not depending on a, q, t. It is not di¢ cult to check
that, when subjected to transfer e T, each local government ￿ chooses t(￿), q(￿) and a(￿) so
as to satisfy the ￿rst order conditions (18)-(20). The term M(￿) must be chosen so as to
leave a zero rent to each type ￿ local government, once they have chosen the optimal values
of e⁄ort, production and tax. The ￿rst term in the expression of e T internalizes the vertical
budget externality due to the existence of ￿nancial penalties, the second term internalizes
the social cost of siphoning o⁄ the neighbor￿ s tax base.
3.4 The normative, benevolent-planner case
We now derive the optimal solution in the normative version of the model, assuming that
local governments want to maximize the total sum of their residents￿utilities. To this end we
simply change the analysis as follows: as indicated above, it is su¢ cient to set ￿ = Nt+’(t),
and S = Nu(q)+NZ(N). With these changes, the central government￿ s objective becomes,
E[Nu(q) + NZ(N) ￿ ’(t) ￿ ￿(a) ￿ (1 + r)(cq + k) + rNt]:
But the free-mobility equilibrium condition yields u(q) ￿ t + Z(N) = u for every citizen.
Thus, the central government should maximize,
E[nu ￿ ’(t) ￿ ￿(a) ￿ (1 + r)(cq + k ￿ nt)]; (17b)
subject to the constraint E(n) = 1, where n is de￿ned by (14)-(15) above. Let ￿ denote
the Lagrange multiplier of the constaint. The ￿rst-order conditions for optimality can be
19derived as before; we get the following four conditions:
￿
0(a) = (1 + r)q; (18b)
￿n
0u
0u = (1 + r)(c + k





0u ￿ [(1 + r)t ￿ ￿]n
0 = (1 + r)n; (20b)
￿ =
1 + (1 + r)E(tn0)
E(n0)
+ u: (21b)
Note that conditions (19), (20) and (21) have changed. The local government￿ s cost of taxa-
tion is now "endogenized". The marginal surplus terms are ￿n0u0u and ’0￿n0u for production
and taxation respectively, given that the economy must be in free-mobility equilibrium. We
can now solve this system in the linear-quadratic case, exactly as speci￿ed above, assuming





  [1 ￿ (1 + r)E(￿)]








Remark that q￿ > 0, if and only if (1 + r)E(￿) < 1. This is a natural consequence of the
normalization u(q) = q: the marginal utility of the public good is constant and equal to 1,
so that, intuitively, average optimal production can be positive if the average marginal cost
term (1 + r)E(￿) is below 1 (we assume that the solution is interior). We get a regular,
interior solution only if ’0 > 0, as can be seen from (29b). Note that ’0 has no reason
to be equal to ’, which makes numerical comparisons with the Political Economy case less
straightforward. Some algebra yields Result 2B.














￿2 = ’0[c2 ￿ (1 + r) 
￿1] ￿ ￿
2(1 + r): (34b)
20and ￿nally, e⁄ort a￿(￿) is the same as above. The system determinant ￿2 is positive if  ,
’0 and c2 are large enough.
A quick comparison of Results 1, 1B and 2, 2B shows that the Welfare Maximiza-
tion variant of the model is formally very close to the Political Economy variant ￿ this is
reassuring. The solutions possess some robust formal features, such as linearity with respect
to ￿ ￿ E(￿). Yet, the solutions might produce di⁄erent numerical results, because, even if
s = 1, ￿ and ￿2, ’ and ’0 are not necessarily the same.
4 Internal Stability Pact under Asymmetric Informa-
tion
We can now start the study of the optimal internal stability pact under asymmetric infor-
mation. The central government cannot observe ￿ and a directly, but observes t, C and q,
or equivalently, observes t, c = C=q, and q. Given that ￿ is not observed by the center, the
value of e⁄ort a cannot be deduced. As in La⁄ont and Tirole (1986), the second-best optimal
contract with local governments is a screening, self-selection mechanism, based on transfer
formulae, i.e., in this context, it is an incentive grant schedule. We exclude the possibility of
collusion among the numerous local governments.
We will rely on the Revelation Principle, saying that under asymmetric information, a
direct revelation mechanism can do as well as any other, indirect, non-revealing mechanism,
from the Principal￿ s point of view.
A direct revelation mechanism (or internal stability pact) is an array of functions
(T(b ￿);c(b ￿);q(b ￿);t(b ￿)), assumed di⁄erentiable, specifying a grant T(b ￿), a marginal cost c(b ￿),
a tax t(b ￿) and a production level q(b ￿) for every possible report b ￿ that the local government
would like to make to the central government. A local government can manipulate the
mechanism by in￿ ating its reported cost b ￿: this allows local authorities to provide less e⁄ort.
More precisely, under the internal stability pact, to remain consistent with their claims, a
local government with true type ￿ must exert a level of e⁄ort b a such that c(b ￿) = ￿ ￿ b a, or
equivalently, b a = ￿ ￿b ￿ +a(b ￿), where of course, a(b ￿) is the e⁄ort of a truthful type b ￿. Given
21this deterministic link between e⁄orts and observable marginal costs, the model is in fact
equivalent to a pure adverse selection problem, in which the di¢ culty is to ensure truthful
revelation of types.
4.1 Incentive compatibility
Let b V (b ￿;￿) denote the utility of a type ￿ local government if they report that their type is
b ￿:
b V (b ￿;￿) ￿ S[q(b ￿)] ￿ ￿(t(b ￿)) + T(b ￿)
+t(b ￿)N(b ￿) ￿ c(b ￿)q(b ￿) ￿ k(q(b ￿)) ￿ ￿[￿ ￿ c(b ￿)] (41)
where ￿ ￿ c(b ￿) is the required level of e⁄ort when posing as a type b ￿, and by de￿nition,
N(b ￿) ￿ n[u ￿ u(q(b ￿)) + t(b ￿)]. Denote simply
V (￿) ￿ b V (￿;￿) ￿ S[q(￿)] ￿ ￿(t(￿)) + T(￿)
+t(￿)N(￿) ￿ c(￿)q(￿) ￿ k(q(￿)) ￿ ￿[￿ ￿ c(￿)] (42)
the utility of a truthful local government.
The internal stability pact (T(b ￿);c(b ￿);q(b ￿);t(b ￿)), is revealing if and only if
b V (￿;￿) ￿ b V (b ￿;￿) (43)
for all (￿;b ￿) in [￿;￿]2. There is an in￿nity of revelation or incentive compatibility constraints.
We ￿rst show that this in￿nity of constraints is equivalent to a pair of simpler constraints.
To this end, we rely on a fundamental Lemma, which is an adaptation of a well-known result
in the Theory of Incentives (e.g., La⁄ont and Tirole (1986), La⁄ont and Martimort (2002)).
Lemma: The revelation constraints are equivalent to the following two conditions: for all
￿,
V
0 (￿) = ￿￿
0(￿ ￿ c(￿)) (IC1 (￿))
22c
0(￿) ￿ 0 (IC2 (￿))
For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof of this result in the Appendix.
4.2 The central government￿ s second-best optimum problem
The central government must now solve the following problem:
max
q(￿);t(￿);a(￿);T(￿);u




subject to IR(￿), i.e., V (￿) ￿ V , IC1 (￿), IC2 (￿), for all ￿, and the population constraint
E(N) = 1.
Since V (￿) is a non-increasing function of ￿, the participation constraint IR(￿) holds
if and only if it holds for the highest type, i.e., V (￿) ￿ 0. Integrating IC1 (￿), yields the





0(x ￿ c(x))dx + V (￿) (44)
The central government would like to pay the smallest possible amount of rent. It
follows that V (￿) = V . Remark then that the most ine¢ cient local government has a zero
rent. Since ￿0 > 0, the other local government types receive an informational rent which is
decreasing with ￿. Note that the rent of type ￿ is also increasing with the e⁄orts of types
￿
0 ￿ ￿.
We now express the transfer T(￿) as a function of other variables; this yields,
T(￿) = V (￿) ￿ S (q(￿)) + ￿(t(￿)) ￿ t(￿)N(￿) + c(￿)q(￿) + k(q(￿)) + ￿(￿ ￿ c(￿)) (45)
Denote the rent of type ￿, as r(￿) = V (￿) ￿ V . The average rent R paid by the central
government is by de￿nition R = E(r). Using integration by parts9, we get,
9E(r) =
R
r(￿)f(￿)d￿ = [r(￿)F(￿)] ￿
R
r0(￿)F(￿)d￿, that is,
E(r) = r(￿)F(￿) ￿ r(￿)F(￿) +
R





0(￿ ￿ c(￿))F (￿)d￿: (46)
We then substitute the expressions for transfer and rent in the central government￿ s objec-
















[c(￿)q(￿) + k(q(￿)) ￿ t(￿)N(￿)]f(￿)d￿ (47)
where a(￿) = ￿ ￿ c(￿), subject to the constraints c0(￿) ￿ 0, and E(N) = 1. Remark that if
we de￿ne the function,





the problem of ￿nding the second-best optimal taxes, e⁄orts, and local productions is the
same as before, if we replace ￿ with ￿ in (17), that is, the center should simply maximize,
E[S ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 + r)(cq + k ￿ tn)]; (49)
subject to E(n) = 1, and c0 ￿ 0. To solve this problem, we ￿rst neglect the constraint
on c0, write the ￿rst-order optimality conditions, and check that IC2 holds afterwards. It
follows that the ￿rst-order necessary conditions for a second-best optimal contract between
the central and local governments can be written as (18)-(21) above, provided that ￿ is used
instead of ￿. The only change is that (18) must now be written,
￿
0(a





= (1 + r)q
￿￿ (￿); (50)
where a￿￿ (￿);q￿￿ (￿);t￿￿ (￿); denote the second-best optimal solution.
We can express the (second-best) optimal incentive grant schedule, denoted T ￿￿, as
follows,
24Result 5. If c0 ￿ 0 holds for all types, then, all local governments such that ￿ < ￿ enjoy
informational rents at the optimum. The second-best optimal grant schedule is given by the
following formula:
T

















We need to check that c0 ￿ 0 holds: we will do it later. To study the distortions
induced by informational asymmetries without having to deal with the complex three-
dimensional comparative statics of the second-best solution, and again to clarify the ex-
position, we will focus on the linear-quadratic case10 (as de￿ned in the preceding section).
We can recycle Results 1 and 2, with some di⁄erences due to the change in the condition











  [s ￿ (1 + r)E(￿ + h)]








The only change in the expression of average production is that the mean type E(￿) has
been replaced by the mean virtual type E(h + ￿). Remark that, using integration by parts,
E(h) =
R
F(x)dx = ￿ ￿ E(￿), and hence E(￿ + h) = ￿. Having solved the ￿rst-order
conditions for the average values of q and t, we solve the complete system for the second-
best optimum a￿￿ (￿);q￿￿ (￿);t￿￿ (￿); using the same logic as above, straightforward algebra
yields the following.
10Not much insight is lost by focusing on the linear-quadratic case, but a lot is gained in terms of under-
standing the solution￿ s structure and economic intuition.
25Result 7. Under asymmetric information, assume that the second-best optimal solution is




￿[’ + 2￿(1 + r)]
￿






[￿ + h ￿ E(￿ + h)]; (55)
where ￿ is de￿ned as in Result 2 above, and ￿nally,
a
￿￿(￿) =  
￿1(1 + r)q
￿￿(￿) ￿ h(￿): (56)
Again, we ￿nd that the di⁄erences between ￿rst-best and second-best are entirely due
to the replacement of types ￿, by Myerson￿ s virtual types11, i.e., ￿ + F(￿)=f(￿).
Consider now the function c￿￿(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ a￿￿(￿). We must check that this function is
non-decreasing. Remark that, using Result 7,
@c￿￿(￿)
@￿















where ￿0 = ￿￿1[’ + 2￿(1 + r)]. It is standard to assume in the literature on incentives,
that h0 > 0, or equivalently, that f=F is a decreasing function. We can therefore state the
following result.
Result 8. Assume that the second-best optimal solution is interior, then if ￿ > 0, and
1 + h0 ￿ 0, the monotonicity condition IC2(￿) (i.e., c￿￿ non-decreasing), holds for every ￿.
4.3 The impact of informational asymmetries
The second-best solution leads to the unusual conclusion that distortions occur at both ends





[ c2 ￿ (1 + r)]
￿











It is not di¢ cult to check that there is a distortion "at the top", formally,








￿(￿) = ￿(1 + r)￿
￿1E(h) > 0;
the most e¢ cient jurisdictions exhibit over-taxation12.
Under the conditions of Result 8, we can try to summarize the di⁄erences between
complete and asymmetric information as follows.
Result 10. Assuming that ￿ > 0, the average second-best local public-good production q￿￿
is smaller than the corresponding ￿rst-best average q￿. The average second-best local tax t
￿￿











and if h0(￿) ￿ 0, both taxation and local public good productions have a greater variance
under asymmetric information:
V ar(q
￿￿) > V ar(q
￿); V ar(t
￿￿) > V ar(t
￿): (59)
Proof. The statement relative to expectations in Result 10 is an immediate consequence of
Result 6. To obtain the property of increased variances, note that, using Results 2 and 6,
V ar(t￿￿) = ￿
2
1V ar(￿ + h), and V ar(t￿) = ￿
2
1V ar(￿). It follows that
V ar(t
￿￿) = V ar(t
￿) + ￿
2
1[V ar(h) + 2Cov(￿;h)]; (60)
12This is related to Lockwood￿ s (1999) "two-sided" distortions.
27where ￿1 = ￿￿￿1(1 + r)￿. Since h0 ￿ 0, we have Cov(￿;h) ￿ 0, and thus V ar(h) +
2Cov(￿;h) ￿ 0, which yields the desired result for the variance of local taxes. The same
reasoning, mutatis mutandis, yields the desired result concerning the variance of production.
Q.E.D.
We conclude that the presence of asymmetric information worsens the situation for the
citizens belonging to ine¢ cient (high ￿) jurisdictions. Informational asymmetries increase
the variance of taxes, keeping the average tax constant, and simultaneously decreases average
production and increases the variance of the public good production. It then seems that the
inequality among citizens increases as a consequence of informational asymmetries. But does
the average utility level decrease? To see this precisely, let u￿ denote the ￿rst-best utility










with a similar expression for u￿. Since E(N) = 1 in either case, we get the following result.
Result 11. The citizens￿average utility level is lower under asymmetric information than






The utility loss is entirely due to the decrease of public production on average, and the average
e⁄ects of other factors (i.e., land prices and taxes) cancel each other.
At the same time, local politicians will be able to consume more rent in every con-
stituency, except the least e¢ cient ones. E⁄ort distortions aim at reducing the cost of rents
for the center: under asymmetric information, the internal stability pact is therefore the
result of an optimal trade-o⁄ between informational rents and cost-reducing e⁄orts. A pow-
erful incentive scheme would push e⁄orts to their ￿rst-best optimal levels, but would bleed
the central government￿ s budget white. Note that the analysis does not provide a standard
result: this is due to free mobility. If citizens were immobile (and uniformly distributed
among jurisdictions), the second-best structure would be more transparent, and would be
exactly analogous to the solution of a Principal-Agent problem ￿ la La⁄ont-Tirole (1986): all
28second-best optimal e⁄ort levels would be distorted downwards as compared to ￿rst best, and
as a consequence, all second-best production levels would be distorted downwards, except
for the most e¢ cient jurisdictions, and local tax rates would be undistorted. The originality
of the present approach comes from the interaction of local taxation and citizen mobility,
more precisely from the presence of horizontal ￿scal externalities induced by mobility. Local
taxes, productions, e⁄orts, and land prices are made interdependent in a non-trivial way, and
what would otherwise have been a standard Principal-Agent model becomes a non-standard
Principal-Multi-Agent structure.
4.4 Implementation of the internal stability pact under asymmet-
ric information
We can use the Taxation Principle13, to show that the internal stability pact (T ￿￿(b ￿); c￿￿(b ￿);
q￿￿(b ￿); t￿￿(b ￿)) (which is a direct revealing mechanism), is equivalent to a nonlinear grant
G￿￿ (c), joint with a production requirement Q￿￿(c), and a local tax requirement ￿￿￿(c). This
shows that the notion of type-reports of local governments to the center is more or less
formal, since in fact, each government will choose in a menu c 7￿! (G￿￿ (c);Q￿￿ (c);￿￿￿(c)),
depending on its observable marginal cost only.
Since c￿￿ (￿) is a strictly increasing function, it can be inverted. Let then ￿ = ￿
￿￿ (c) ￿
(c￿￿)￿1(c) be this inverse function. We de￿ne the non-linear grant function as, G￿￿ (c) ￿
T ￿￿(￿
￿￿ (c)). And de￿ne Q￿￿ (c) = q￿￿(￿
￿￿ (c)); ￿￿￿(c) = t￿￿(￿
￿￿ (c)). When faced with this
menu of choices, type ￿ chooses c so as to get c = ￿ ￿ a￿￿(￿).
Remark that the optimal solution does not really admit a decentralized choice of local
taxes by local governments: each local government will be asked to choose in a menu, which
determines the grant G, the local production Q, and the local tax rate ￿ simultaneously
as a function of the observed unit cost c. Local jurisdictions are free in principle to choose
their local tax, but the optimal incentives system will drive every rational local government
to choose the second-best rate t￿￿. Standard Principal-Agent, optimal regulation theories
do not provide a justi￿cation for genuine ￿scal decentralization ￿ at least not is this simple
13Again, see La⁄ont and Martimort (2002).
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5 Conclusion
We have studied the optimal contract linking a central government to local governments,
under conditions of asymmetric information, when the aggregate de￿cit of the public sector
must be reduced, due to ￿nancial costs or penalties. The problem is to understand how bud-
getary austerity will be "shared" with local governments, when governments are motivated
by re-election perspectives and rents. Our results rely on optimal regulation theory, applied
to a Principal-Multi-Agent framework. Due to the interdependence of jurisdictions through
citizens￿migrations, the solution obtained is not formally that of a standard Principal-Agent
problem. We characterize the shape of the second-best optimal grant schedule, when the
cost of local public goods depends on unobservable characteristics and "e⁄orts" of the local
government. The second-best optimal production of local public goods and local tax rates
are jointly distorted. The most e¢ cient (low cost) jurisdictions produce more, tax more,
experience higher land prices and attract more inhabitants than the less e¢ cient (high cost)
jurisdictions. Informational asymmetries increase the variance of both local tax rates and
local productions of public goods, and the average utility and local public good production
decreases, with respect to the complete information benchmark.
306 Appendix
Proof of the Lemma.
The optimal report of an agent solves Maxb ￿b V (b ￿;￿). The ￿rst-order necessary condition
@b V (b ￿;￿)=@b ￿ = 0 can be rewritten,
0 = S
0[q(b ￿)]q
0(b ￿) + T
0(b ￿) ￿ c




0(b ￿) + (t(b ￿)N(b ￿))
0 + ￿
0[￿ ￿ c(b ￿)]c
0(b ￿) (61)































And substituting the necessary condition for truthful revelation we ￿nd IC1(￿), that is,
V 0(￿) = ￿￿0(￿ ￿ c(￿)). Now, the second-order necessary condition for truthful revelation
holds if
@2b V (b ￿;￿)
@b ￿
2 ￿ 0
whenever b ￿ = ￿. Di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition for truthful revelation and sub-
stituting in the second-order necessary condition, we ￿nd that the second-order necessary
condition boils down to ￿￿00[￿ ￿ c(￿)]c0(￿) ￿ 0. Given that we assume, ￿00 > 0, this
yields c0(￿) ￿ 0, that is, IC2(￿). We have proved that IC1(￿) and IC2(￿) are necessary for
revelation.

































0(x)] = ￿"[y ￿ c(x)]c
0(x) ￿ 0:
We have proved that the local conditions IC1 and IC2 are su¢ cient for revelation. Q.E.D.
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